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Ce rapport présente les résultats d’une expérience effectuée en laboratoire
impliquant environ 250 sujets résidant dans la région de Montréal. L’expérience tente
de répondre à trois questions : 1) Les travailleurs à faible revenu investissent-ils dans
des actifs diversifiés?; 2) Les sujets sont-ils prêts à reporter leur consommation dans le
futur en échange de rendements financiers substantiels?; 3) Comment ces sujets
perçoivent-ils les choix risqués? Les réponses à ces questions vont permettre d’éclairer
le sujet principal de cette recherche menée par le SRDC, à savoir : Si on leur procure
les bonnes incitations, les travailleurs à faible revenu auront-ils tendance à épargner
pour investir dans du capital humain?
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment involving some 250
subjects in the Montreal area. The experiment focused on three main questions : (1)
Will the working poor invest in various assets? (2) Are these subjects willing to delay
consumption for substantial returns? (3) How do these subjects view risky choices?
Answering these questions will help answering the key research question : Given the
right incentive, will the working poor save to invest in human capital
Mots-clés : Travailleurs à faible revenu, expérience, incitations à l’épargne, capital
humain, investissement
Keywords: Working poor, experiment, savings, human capital, investment
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iii 1 Introduction 
In July 2001 the Social Research and Demonstration Corporation (SRDC) and Social and 
Enterprise Development Innovations (SEDI) launched a large demonstration project to test 
whether low-income people can be encouraged to save money to increase their human capital 
and, in turn, their standard of living in the long-run. Under this multi-year project, called 
learn$ave, participants open individual development accounts (IDAs), and for each dollar that 
participants put in their IDAs, program sponsors contribute matching dollars up to a 
predetermined limit. The matched funds must be used for post-secondary education, training, or 
small business start-ups. The success of this project depends on the ability of the target 
population (individuals with family incomes of less than 120 per cent of Statistics Canada’s low 
income cut-offs) to save and their willingness to save for this particular purpose. 
As part of the design phase for the learn$ave demonstration project, SRDC made use of 
experimental economics to shed light on the behaviour and preferences of the working poor 
with respect to saving for learning activities. Laboratory experiments have been developing in 
the academic arena for some time, but they have yet to be used in conjunction with large-scale 
demonstration projects or social experiments conducted in real-life settings. Social experiments, 
using random assignment to program and control groups, remain the most powerful 
methodology available to isolate the impact of proposed changes in programs or policies. 
However, laboratory experiments can be used as a complementary approach to generate valuable 
information for the design of those social experiments and, perhaps, preview some their 
forthcoming results. 
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment involving some 250 subjects in the 
Montreal area. The experiment focused on three main questions: (1) Will the working poor 
invest in various assets? (2) Are these subjects willing to delay consumption for substantial 
returns? (3) How do these subjects view risky choices? Answering these questions will inform 
the key research question: Given the right incentive, will the working poor save to invest in 
human capital? 
Section 2 of the paper discusses the advantages of laboratory experiments over other approaches 
for learning about individuals’ behaviours and preferences. Section 3 presents the research 
design and operational details of the experiment. Section 4 provides descriptive observations on 
the subjects’ behaviours and choices as revealed through the experiment. Econometric 
investigation of time preference and attitude towards risk is offered in Section 5. Section 6 
provides a more in-depth analysis of the investment choices and decisions on an individual basis. 
Section 7 concludes the paper with a look at policy implications and suggestions for further 
research possibilities.  
 
1 2 Advantages of Laboratory Experiments 
The effectiveness of a policy can be enhanced substantially if it is tailored to the preferences of 
the target population. Economists employ three different methodologies to measure these 
preferences: outcome-based measures, attitudinal survey questions, and experimentation. 
Laboratory experimental research is a relatively new addition to the economist’s toolkit, and has 
the potential to outperform the two traditional empirical methodologies. 
2.1 An important addition to the economist’s toolkit 
The most commonly used empirical tool is the use of outcome-based measures of behaviour to infer 
the preferences of economic agents. Examples of these outcome measures include years of schooling, 
individual savings account balances, wages, retirement savings, and financial wealth. These measures 
are invaluable, but they provide only indirect information on many questions of interest. For example, 
an individual’s rate of time preference cannot be directly inferred from information about the balance 
in his or her savings account. Many socio-economic factors (such as income) and behavioural 
propensities (including risk aversion) jointly influence an individual’s savings behaviour. Hence, in 
general, outcomes data yield very noisy measures of preference parameters.  
The second traditional empirical tool is attitudinal surveys. Surveys are more flexible in that they can 
address any topic. Social scientists can ask respondents whether they are patient by using 
hypothetical questions about choices over time. Survey questions can also ask respondents about 
their intentions with regard to human capital investment. While this approach is valuable in many 
cases it also has important caveats. Sceptical social scientists resist taking respondents’ self-reported 
statements at face value, whether they are about patience or other attitudes and behaviour. Survey 
questions may misrepresent the truth for several reasons. Respondents may misrepresent their 
attitudes or preferences because inaccurate attitudes may flatter their own self-image.
1 Respondents 
may also misrepresent their own characteristics because they may interpret the question in their own 
way, which may differ from the interpretation of the researchers or of other subjects. In addition, 
respondents may bias their answers for “presentational” reasons, such as to look good in the eyes of 
the survey administrator. 
In addition to economists’ two central empirical tools — behavioural measures and attitudinal 
survey measures — a third empirical tool has recently entered the economic mainstream: controlled 
laboratory experiments. In these experiments, subjects make real decisions, thereby revealing 
preferences that researchers are interested in. For example, instead of asking about patience, an 
experimentalist will give subjects 10 dollars and the opportunity to save that money with a certain 
return. The subjects’ willingness to give up this income in order to realize higher gains in the future 
is one possible measure of patience.  
This approach has several advantages over the traditional empirical tools. First, these experiments 
control for situational variation by placing subjects in identical settings. This eliminates much of the 
uncontrolled variation that plagues outcome-based behavioural measures of preferences. Second, 
because subjects typically make decisions involving real money, it is costly to the subject to 
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1This problem occurs with “hard” data as well — self-reported income is notoriously inaccurate, and self-reported housing 
values regularly overstate true resale prices. See Goodman & Ittner, 1992.  
4  
                                                    
misrepresent his true preferences. Ensuring anonymity can further minimize misrepresentation 
effects: if the experimenter is not able to link actions to particular individuals, then the subject has no 
incentive to misrepresent himself. Finally, the decisions made by subjects are real, not hypothetical. A 
subject makes an actual choice among alternatives, and that choice can be used to infer preferences. 
Many of the original economic experiments tried to measure the overall or average behavioural 
propensities of entire populations of subjects. Experimentalists compared these propensities 
with the predictions of economic theory. Economists are just beginning a second wave of 
experimental research in which experiments are increasingly being used to document behavioural 
differences across individuals and to identify the correlates of those differences. (See for example 
Eckel & Grossman, 1998, in press-a, in press-b; Ansic & Powell, 1997; see also Schubert, 
Brown, Gyster, & Brachinger, 1999, on sex differences; Harbaugh & Krause, 2000, on children; 
Blondel, Lohéac, & Rinaudo, 2000, on drug users.) Results can be used to predict the response 
to public policies by different identifiable subgroups of the population. 
2.2 Particular features of this experiment 
The experiment presented in this paper innovates in several ways. One big question about 
experiments is the extent to which behaviour in the economic laboratory predicts behaviour in 
the field. External (or field) validity is questionable in part because of the very general, context-
free environment of most decision-making laboratory experiments. However, this study 
incorporates relevant contextual aspects of the decision-making process that are likely to improve 
the external (field) validity of the experimental results. For example, as explained below, the 
subjects of this experiment are making actual choices between alternatives such as (a) education 
for a family member, or (b) a fixed amount of cash. 
Generalizing from the laboratory can also be problematic because of the necessarily small financial 
stakes that often characterize laboratory experiments.
2 However, this study makes use of substantial 
economic stakes. Participants could earn as much as $400, and average earnings were $130.
 3 
Almost all experimental economic research is conducted with undergraduate subjects, 
eliminating any hope of determining the effects of age on behaviour. The range of incomes of 
undergraduates also tends to vary little as compared with the general population, making 
inferences about low-income adults problematic. This research avoids these problems by 
recruiting subjects who belong to the population targeted by the policy or program under study. 
One last particular feature of this paper is the use of experimental economics to develop direct 
behavioural measures of the extent to which individual characteristics and socio-economic status 
influence patience and risk aversion. Very little is known about these individual characteristics. 
This experimental work on patience and risk adds to the literature in several ways. In this study, 
discount functions are measured in a wide range of subjects, enabling the identification of how 
discounting varies with personal characteristics. Important effects that are identified include (1) the 
extent to which patience appears to differ across socio-economic groups, (2) the extent to which 
some socio-economic groups show greater evidence of time inconsistency and, (3) the extent to 
which patience changes over the life cycle.  
 
 
2Note that there is conflicting evidence for the importance of high stakes. Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, provide a survey on this 
question. 
3Subjects could earn as much as $400 in cash, $600 in education expenses for the year, or $600 in a five- or seven-year fixed 
guaranteed investment certificate. 3 Research Design and Methods 
This section describes the design and operational details of the laboratory experiment, beginning 
with the selection of subjects.  
3.1 Selection of subjects 
To maximize the policy relevance of the results, the experiment was designed around the 
parameters of the learn$ave project. Recruitment efforts were organized through community 
groups whose membership included many working poor. In addition to providing experimental 
subjects, this recruitment was used as a pilot recruitment for the eventual demonstration project. 
All of the experimental sessions occurred in Montreal over a period of three weeks in 
November 2000. 
A total of 256 subjects participated, of which 72 per cent had a family income of less than 120 per 
cent of Statistics Canada low income cut-offs (LICOs).
1 Average total family income for the entire 
sample was approximately $22,500. Seventy-two per cent of the subjects were labour market 
participants, either employed or unemployed. Two thirds of the subjects were women. Participants 
were far from being uneducated: on average, they reported completing 13 to 14 years of schooling, 
78 per cent of them claimed to hold a high-school diploma, and 26 per cent reported having 
attained a university degree. They were not completely without assets or access to capital markets: 
26 per cent had a car and 54 per cent possessed a credit card. A significant fraction planned for the 
future: 47 per cent declared that they made regular contributions to a savings account and 27 per 
cent contributed to a retirement plan. Participation in lotteries was substantial but not pervasive: 
27 per cent had never bought a lottery ticket.  
Some participants who had not been targeted by the recruitment efforts were still able to learn 
about the experiment. Word of mouth about the experience and the potential for substantial 
sums of cash travelled fast, even in a relatively large city like Montreal. The largest group of 
unintended recruits was full-time students; the 31 students represent 12 per cent of the total 
number of subjects. Care was taken to identify this subgroup separately in the analysis. 
3.2 Description of the procedure 
To advertise and recruit for the experiment, a brief notice was posted in low-income 
neighbourhoods and distributed at community group meetings. Subjects volunteered for the 
experiment by calling ahead and agreeing to show up at a location identified by the 
experimenters. Upon arrival, they were given a $12 show-up fee. The potential for additional 
financial compensation was explained and demonstrated to them after everyone participating in 
one session was assembled in one room. They were presented with two surveys (with different 
colours): one survey contained 64 compensated questions or choices, and another contained 
43 non-compensated or information questions. They were told that at the end of the experiment 
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1Statistics Canada annually publishes a set of measures called the low income cut-offs (LICOs). Roughly speaking, the cut-offs 
mark income levels in which people have to spend disproportionate amounts of their incomes on food, shelter, and clothing. 
The LICOs vary by family size and size of community. Before-tax income cut-offs were used in view of the fact that before-tax 
income data was collected from the respondents. one of the 64 compensated questions would be selected at random and they would be paid 
according to the answer they provided for that selected question. Instructions for the experiment 
are reproduced in Appendix A.  
The 64 compensated questions were designed to support the three main questions to be 
addressed: (1) Will the working poor invest in various assets? (2) Are these subjects willing to 
delay consumption for substantial returns? (3) How do these subjects view risky choices? 
Figure 3.1 provides an example of one compensated question from the experiment that was 
concerned with the subjects’ preferences for investing in education. There were three versions of 
this type of question, with $200, $400, and $600 as the amounts being offered for an investment 
in education being weighted against an offer of $100 cash (one week from the day the 
experimental session was conducted). 
Figure 3.1: Sample Compensation Question From the Experiment 
You must choose A or B: 
   Choice A: $100 one week from today 
   Choice B: $400 in your own training or education 
 
These two choices are represented by the two following 
pictures. Please circle your choice: 
 
 
$ 100 one week from 
today 
 


















Once subjects had answered both surveys, the random selection of the compensated question was 
done with the use of a bingo cage containing 64 balls, numbered 1 to 64. Each subject was allowed 
to examine the numbered balls. The number on the ball drawn from the cage identified the 
compensation question for which they would be paid. If the compensation question selected dictated a 
monetary prize on the same day of the experiment, the prize was given in cash, on site. Delayed 
payments were mailed in the form of a cheque dated for the date indicated in the compensation 
question. There were many non-monetary prizes such as reimbursable educational expenses, 
guaranteed investment certificates (GICs), and gift certificates. A description of all prizes can be 
found in Appendix A. When the prize was a GIC or gift certificate, the experimenter signed an 
IOU and the prize was delivered to the subject by courier. All of the long-term GICs were 
purchased and distributed in early January 2001. All participants were required to sign a receipt. 
The average payoff per participant resulting from the experiment was approximately $130. Each 
experimental session, from instruction to payoff, took about an hour and a half. 
 
6   Every effort was made to make the experiment accessible and non-threatening to all of the 
subjects. No computers were used in the administration of the experiment and simple devices 
like bingo balls and dice were used to generate random draws. Special attention was paid to the 
visual presentation and design of the compensation questions. Because the experiments were 
conducted in the neighbourhoods where the subjects lived, a pen-and-paper instrument was 
preferred over a computerized experiment. In the experimental pretest, some of the choices 
were found to be too challenging. To address this problem, a short set of practice compensation 
questions was incorporated into the instruction portion of the experiment. An example of each 
type of compensation question and the random draw process was illustrated in a six-question practice 
questionnaire. The subjects seemed to trust the experimenters to pay them as was described. In 
the debriefing questionnaire, 95 per cent of the subjects indicated that they were confident they 
would be paid in the way that was described to them in the experiment. 
All experimental forms were pretested to minimize comprehension errors. However, in a few 
instances some subjects showed an inconsistency in their answers. In three of the questions 
subjects were offered the choice between $100 next week or $200, $400, or $600 in educational 
expenses. Some subjects made inconsistent choices within a category of questions. For example, 
a subject who chose the $200 investment in educational expenses over the $100 in cash, yet also 
chose $100 cash over the $400 or $600 choice of educational expenses, was termed 
“inconsistent.” Overall, very few subjects were inconsistent. Among the compensation questions 
concerning educational expenses (compensation questions 55, 62, and 59 summarized in 
Table 3.1, below) only 16 individuals or six per cent demonstrated an inconsistency. As these 
investment preference questions are central to the descriptive statistics in Section 4 and the 
analysis in Section 6, inconsistent subjects were not included.  
3.3 Compensated questions 
Three major groupings of questions were used for the compensated questionnaire: 
(1) investment preference, (2) time preference, and (3) risk preference. Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 
3.3.3 summarize the choices facing the participants in each category.
2 
Table 3.1 summarizes 13 of the 64 compensation questions that participants had to make as part 
of the compensated survey. The first column in the table contains the question numbers used in 
the compensated survey. Each row of the table represents the alternatives presented to the subject 
for each question. For example, Question 52 consisted of a choice between $100 that could be 
spent on the subject’s own education and $100 that could be spent on a durable goods item. 
The first three choices in Table 3.1 (52, 53, and 54) are used to determine one measure of 
preference ordering between different forms of investment. Investing in one’s own education is 
compared with family member’s education, retirement savings, or purchase of durable goods.
3 
Various financial tools were used to make the compensated questions as close to these four 
categories in context as possible. For example, the retirement option was paid as an initial 
deposit into a frozen GIC redeemable in seven years. Each category of investment is described 
in Appendix A, as it was presented to the subjects.  
                                                      
2In the experiment the order of the compensation questions, by and within each major category, was randomly modified. 
 
7 
3The selection of investment categories reflects discussions that took place at the start of the learn$ave project. In the learn$ave 
project, participants can use matched savings accumulated in their IDAs to pay for their own educational expenses or micro-
enterprise start-ups. In other IDAs schemes or demonstration projects being conducted in North America, eligible expenses 
may include other categories of investment, such as housing, retirement savings, and educational expenses incurred by a spouse 
or a child. Table 3.1: Summary Description of Preference Questions 
Question 
Number 
Cash ($) (One 









52   100      100 
53   500    500   
54   500 500     
55 100  200       
56 100    600     
57  100    600   
58  100      200 
59 100  600       
60 166    500     
61  250    500   
62 100  400       
63 250    500     
64 166      500   
3.3.1 Investment preference 
The other 10 choices summarized in Table 3.1 address the issue of preference for investment for the 
four possible categories of investment. The choices were designed to simulate payroll deductions of 
varying amounts. For example, a choice would be: Option A: $100 a week from today or Option B: 
$200 for educational expenses. Or, Option A: $100 a week from today or Option B: $600 for 
educational expenses. These choices are designed to help pinpoint optimal match rates for the 
learn$ave demonstration.
4 
Theoretically, it would have been ideal to have subjects save their own funds in exchange for an 
amount earmarked for investment in their education. However, that requirement would have 
made the administrative cost and timing of the laboratory experiment infeasible. The learn$ave 
demonstration is a better tool for actually testing the savings behaviour over time. The 
laboratory alternative to having subjects save their own funds was to give subjects the choice 
between $100 in cash and $X in asset investment. In this context, high payoffs create salient 
decisions. For instance, in order to select the educational outcome, subjects would have to give 
up $100 in cash. Given the range of the subjects’ incomes, $100 represented a substantial 
amount of money to them.
5  
The nature of the alternative to cash also created the necessity for the experimenter to offer high 
payoffs. For instance, it is difficult to envisage situations in which educational expenses would 
not amount to a few hundred dollars. As an added benefit, the high payoffs were clearly salient 
to the subjects and they paid close attention to the procedure.  
                                                      
4The cash alternative was paid out one week from the day of the experiment to minimize the bias of mistrust. It was the nature 
of the investment alternatives that they be distributed at a later time than the experiment date. For example, a GIC was issued 
by the bank in the name of the subject or a selected family member after the experiment was completed. It was necessary that 
the subject trusted the experimenter to do this task after the completion of the experiment. If the cash alternative had been 
available immediately, subjects might have chosen the cash alternative rather than having to trust the experimenter. 
 
8   
5The cash alternative to investment options ranged from $100 to $250. 3.3.2 Time preference 
A series of time preferences were elicited by asking subjects when they preferred to receive a 
certain payoff. Table 3.2 summarizes the time preference compensated questions. 

























6       71.50    2  71.54  10 
2       71.15    3  71.21  10 
17       71.20    7  71.34  10 
12       71.10    14  71.37  10 
4       71.00   28  71.54  10 
9       72.00    2  72.20  50 
3       72.15    3  72.45  50 
13       72.25    7  72.94  50 
10       72.10    14  73.48  50 
8       72.05   28  74.81  50 
19     73.25      2  74.05  200 
11     73.10      3  74.30  200 
14     73.00      7  75.80  200 
21     73.30      14  78.92  200 
18     73.15      28  84.37  200 
20       73.25    2  74.05  200 
22       73.10    3  74.30  200 
15       73.00    7  75.80  200 
24       73.30    14  78.92  200 
25       73.15    28  84.37  200 
26         73.25  2  74.05  200 
16         73.10  3  74.30  200 
5         73.00  7  75.80 200 
28         73.30  14  78.92  200 
23         73.15  28  84.37  200 
7   72.25        2  73.75 380 
29   72.10        3  74.35  380 
30   72.00        7  77.25  380 
32   72.50        14  83.07  380 
33     72.25      2  73.75  380 
35     72.10      3  74.35  380 
36     72.00      7  77.25  380 
1     72.50     14  83.07 380 
37     26.15      2  26.69  380 
27     26.05      3  26.86  380 
24     26.25      7  28.16  380 
31     26.10      14  29.90  380 
 
 
9 Subjects were presented with the opportunity to take their payoff at some date,   (say two weeks 
from today), or to delay payoff until some date,   (say two weeks and two days from today). 
If the subject chose the delayed payoff, the subject was rewarded for waiting. Table 3.2 
summarizes the 37 questions, varying in terms of initial payoffs and alternative payoffs with 
respect to days lapsed and discount rates. For example, Question 6 gave subjects the choice 
between $71.50 in seven days and $71.54 in nine days, rewarding the subject $0.04 for waiting 
two additional days. This would be equivalent to an annualized rate of return of 10 per cent. 
These responses can be used to measure the overall degree of patience. 
t
n t +
3.3.3 Risk preference 
In Table 3.3, the questions with which participants’ attitudes toward risk were elicited are 
summarized with 14 pairs of lottery choices. 
Table 3.3: Summary Description of the Risk-Preference Questions 
 Lotteries 
Question Number  Less Risky Alternative  More Risky Alternative 
38 ($60.00;  1.00)  ($120.00;  0.50) or  ($0.00;  0.50) 
39 ($100.00;  1.00)  ($200.00;  0.50) or  ($0.00;  0.50) 
40 ($60.00;  1.00)  ($240.00;  0.25) or  ($0.00;  0.75) 
41 ($100.00;  1.00)  ($400.00;  0.25) or  ($0.00;  0.75) 
42 ($60.00;  1.00)  ($80.00;  0.75) or  ($0.00;  0.25) 
43 ($100.00;  1.00)  ($133.33;  0.75) or  ($0.00;  0.25) 
44  ($100.00; 0.50) or ($0.00; 0.50)  ($200.00; 0.25) or  ($0.00;  0.75) 
45  ($100.00; 0.40 or ($0.00; 0.60)  ($400.00; 0.10)  or  ($0.00; 0.90) 
46 ($60.00;  1.00)  ($80.00;  0.50) or  ($40.00;  0.50) 
47 ($80.00;  1.00)  ($100.00;  0.50) or  ($60.00;  0.50) 
48 ($120.00;  1.00)  ($175.00;  0.80) or  ($0.00;  0.20) 
49 ($40.00;  1.00)  ($90.00;  0.50) or  ($0.00;  0.50) 
50 ($75.00;  1.00)  ($275.00;  0.30) or  ($0.00;  0.70) 
51  ($120.00; 0.50) or ($0.00; 0.50)  ($175.00; 0.40) or  ($0.00;  0.60) 
Notes: The notation ($X; Y) simply means that $X dollars is offered with probability Y. For the first 10 questions, the expected 
value of the less risky alternative equals the expected value of the more risky alternative. For the last four questions, the 
expected value of the less risky alternative is less than that for the risky alternative. 
The three pairs of questions, 39 and 44, 41 and 45, and 48 and 51, are common-ratio lotteries. 
Through these choices, subjects reported their preference for monetary gambles. For example, 
in Question 38, the participant is asked to choose between Option A yielding a certain $60 (that 
is $60 with probability of 1), and Option B yielding a 50 per cent chance of wining $120 (that is 
$120 with probability of 0.5).
6 This series of questions with various payoffs and levels of risk can 
be used to explore the risk aversion of the participants.  
                                                      
 
10   
6If 1 of the 14 monetary-gamble compensation questions was randomly selected for payoff, and the participant had selected an 
option that included a probability of winning a cash amount of less than 1, that participant was asked to simultaneously roll two 
10-sided dice. The roll of the dice was used for a random selection of a number between 1 and 100. For instance, if the (cont’d)  
11 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
3.4 Information questionnaire (no compensation) 
To complete the experiment, the subjects were asked to fill out an anonymous, 43-question 
survey. The first half of the survey contained demographic and behavioural questions (such as 
sex, income, education, and main activity). The second half of the survey contained attitudinal 
measures of subjects’ self-perceived patience, risk aversion, locus of control, and savings 
behaviour. Variables from this survey are used in the analysis of the compensated questions. The 
43-question survey and summary statistics can be found in appendices A and B. 
 
probability of winning the prize was 50 per cent, then a roll between 0 and 50 would be considered a winning roll. A roll 
between 51 and 100 would not be a winning roll. 4 Revealed Behaviours 
Results of the experiment are presented in figures 4.1 to 4.6 and tables 4.1 to 6.6 in this and the 
next two sections. The results are presented for subgroups of subjects broken down by their 
main declared activity. The Labour Force subgroup was the largest subgroup in the sample and 
is comprised of those who declared their main activity to be working, unemployed, or on leave 
from a job. The Non-labour Force subgroup are those subjects who named their main activity to 
be “taking care of family” or housework. The Student subgroup is the smallest portion of the 
sample and is currently enrolled in school with no other main declared activity. The Low Income 
subgroup contains those subjects whose family income is less than 120 per cent of Statistics 
Canada’s low income cut-offs. Results are also presented by the sex of the subject. Note that 
these subpopulations are not mutually exclusive. 
4.1 Some descriptive results on investing in human capital 
Figures 4.1 to 4.7 present core results of this experiment by illustrating the percentage of 
participants who would be prepared to save (or to forego cash) in response to various levels of 
incentives to invest in their own education or training. For clarity, inconsistent subjects were 
excluded from figures 4.1 to 4.7.
1 
4.1.1 Cash vs. own education 
The top graph in Figure 4.1 indicates the percentage of subjects who chose $200, $400, or $600 
earmarked for educational expenses over $100 cash one week from the date of the experiment. 
These choices represent trade-offs between cash amounts and funds for education at matching 
rates of 1 to 1, 1 to 3, and 1 to 5.
2 At the lowest matching rate of 1 to 1, just over a fifth 
(22.9 per cent) of the participants chose education over cash. When subjects were presented with 
the opportunity analogous to the IDA learn$ave matching offer ($400 in educational expenses or 
$100 in cash), 43.8 per cent of subjects accepted the offer of education and training. At the 
highest matching rate of 1 to 5, 54.6 per cent of participants chose $600 for educational 
expenses when offered as an alternative to $100 cash. This indicates that about 45 per cent of 
the participants either did not have the ability to pay one sixth of their educational expense or did 
not have the desire to pay for their own education. Given that 72 per cent of subjects had family 
incomes below 120 per cent of Statistics Canada’s low income cut-offs it is reasonable to suspect 
that the cash alternative to investing in education was very attractive. Because this choice entails 
giving up money they would otherwise receive from participating in the experiment — i.e. 
“house money” — rather than their own earned income, these results most likely overstate 
slightly the willingness of participants to forego current income for investment in human capital 
under the learn$ave program. If participants had to use their own funds and give up planned 
consumption to do so, one would expect the take-up rate to be less than indicated in Figure 4.1. 
                                                      
1As stated earlier, very few subjects demonstrated an inconsistency in their choices between cash and assets: 6 per cent (16 subjects) 
were inconsistent concerning their own education; 5.5 per cent (14 subjects) were inconsistent concerning the choices involving a 
family member’s education; and 5 per cent (12 subjects) were inconsistent concerning their retirement. The student category is the 
only category where one individual’s inconsistency actually had a significant effect on the overall outcome of a particular category. 
This was simply because the student population in our sample was so small that the aberration was apparent.  
 
13 
2“1 to 5” is short form for five additional dollars for every dollar the subject contributes (or sacrifices) to the designated expense 
or savings option. Figure 4.1: All Population 
Percentage of Participants Choosing Their Own Education Over $100 
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14    
Figure 4.2: Labour Force — Those Subjects Who Declared Their Main Activity To Be 
Working, Unemployed, or On Leave From a Job 
Percentage of Participants Choosing Their Own Education Over $100 
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15 Figure 4.3: Non-labour Force — Those Subjects Who Named Their Main Activity To Be 
“Taking Care of Family” or Housework 
Percentage of Participants Choosing Their Own Education Over $100 
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16   Figure 4.4: Students — Subjects Who Were Currently Enrolled in School With No Other 
Main Declared Activity 
Percentage of Participants Choosing Their Own Education Over $100 
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17 Figure 4.5: Low-Income — Subjects Who Reported Family Income of Less Than  
120 Per Cent of Statistics Canada’s Low Income Cut-Offs 
Percentage of Participants Choosing Their Own Education Over $100 
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18   Figure 4.6: Men 
Percentage of Participants Choosing Their Own Education Over $100 
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Figure 4.7: Women 
Percentage of Participants Choosing Their Own Education Over $100 
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20   Except for the Student subgroup, in which the rates of choosing education are consistently higher 
for all match rates, the patterns of behaviour observed in other population subgroups shown in 
top halves of figures 4.2 to 4.7 (Labour Force, Non-labour Force, Low Income, Men, and 
Women), are similar to the overall population. Comparing women and men, men appear to be 
more sensitive to the matching rate than the women, starting off with a lower percentage of take-
up for the 1 to 1 match rate (20.7 per cent vs. 24.1 per cent) and ending with a higher take-up 
rate for the 1 to 5 match rate (57.3 per cent vs. 53.2 per cent).  
4.1.2 Cash vs. education of a family member 
The bottom halves of figures 4.1 to 4.7 represent the percentage of subjects who chose amounts 
earmarked for educational expenses of a family member over cash amounts one week from the 
date of the experiment. Although the absolute monetary amounts differ, the matching rates are 
equivalent to the match rates represented in the cash vs. own educational expenses: 1 to 1, 1 to 
3, and 1 to 5. For example, in the lowest subsidy rate offered, participants were asked to choose 
between $250 cash a week from the day of the experiment and a GIC with a $500 deposit value 
bearing interest with a fixed maturity of five years. If this certificate of deposit was won, the 
winning participant had to identify the bearer (family member recipient) on the day of the 
experiment. It was emphasized by the experimenter that those certificates were to be used for 
the education of a family member.
3 
Figure 4.1 shows that 24.4 per cent of all participants chose the $500 in family member education 
over $250 in cash (1 to 1 match rate), 36.0 per cent chose the $500 in family member education 
over $166 in cash (1 to 3 match rate), and 47.9 per cent chose the $600 in family member 
education over $100 in cash (1 to 5 match rate). Similar results hold for the Low Income 
subpopulation.
4 However, for the participants declaring their main activity to be taking care of 
their family (the Non-labour Force subpopulation, see Figure 4.3), these proportions are 
substantially higher at 53.3 per cent, 63.3 per cent, and 73.3 per cent, respectively. This 
observation requires a deeper look. A substantially smaller proportion of the Non-labour Force 
subpopulation chose education for themselves when faced with the same match rates (24.1 per 
cent, 41.4 per cent, and 51.7 per cent respectively). It may be that members of this subpopulation 
consider an investment in education to be a better investment for family members than for 
themselves. Further analysis of family member education is undertaken in Section 6.2. 
4.1.3 Cash vs. retirement savings 
The last category of investment considered is retirement savings. The experiment included three 
compensated questions that let the participants reveal their preferences for retirement savings. 
The choices varied cash and retirement savings (a fixed GIC with seven-year maturity) 
alternatives along the same match rates as for those of educational expenses and investment in a 
family member’s education. Figure 4.8 represents the percentages of all subjects who chose to 
forego the cash alternative for retirement savings. Further analysis of retirement savings is 
undertaken in Section 6.3. 
                                                      
3Five years from now it will be impossible to verify if the proceeds from the GICs will be invested in family members’ education. 
However, observation of the subjects and their reactions to the instructions and outcomes during and after the experiment leads 
us to believe that participants’ choices did reflect an understanding that the use of the GICs would indeed be restricted to uses 
related to family member education. 
 
21 
4It is interesting to compare these proportions with the results from the newly released Survey of Approaches to Educational 
Planning (SAEP) by Statistics Canada. In this survey, less than 20 per cent of parents reported saving for their children’s 
education in households where annual family income was below $30,000. See Daily, Statistics Canada, April 10, 2001.     Figure 4.8: All Population 
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4.2 Preference ordering over education, education of a family member, 
and retirement savings 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 concern preference ordering over the three possible investment alternatives for 
the 256 participants. Table 4.1 summarizes the decisions of subjects in two situations, both 
involving direct comparisons between two of the asset alternatives valued at $500. For the first 
question, subjects were presented with a choice between $500 for their own educational 
expenses or $500 for the education of a family member (in the form of a fixed GIC, bearing 
interest and redeemable in five years). In the other choice pairing, the choice was between $500 
in educational expenses or $500 for retirement savings (in the form of a fixed GIC, bearing 
interest and redeemable in seven years). 
Table 4.1: Preference Ordering of Investment Alternatives 
First Choice: $500 for own educational expenses (Own) vs. education of family member (Fam) 
Second Choice: $500 for own educational expenses (Own) vs. retirement savings (Ret) 
Reference Populations  Choices 
Labour Force  Own (60.0%) > Fam; Own (51.9%) > Ret 
Non-labour Force  Fam (74.2%) > Own; Own (54.8%) > Ret 
Student  Own (71.0%) > Fam; Own (67.7%) > Ret 
Low Income  Own (54.6%) > Fam; Own (53.0%) > Ret 
Men  Own (64.7%) > Fam; Own (63.5%) > Ret 
Women  Own (52.6%) > Fam; Own (52.6%) > Ret 
All  Fam (56.6%) > Own; Own (52.7%) > Ret 
(   ) Percentage of participants choosing this investment option. 
 
22   Table 4.2: Preference Ordering — $100 Cash vs. $600 in Own Educational Expenses, 
Education of Family Member, and Retirement Savings 
 
Reference Populations  Choices 
Labour Force  Own (51.9%) > Fam (45.9%) > Ret (45.4%) 
Non-labour Force  Fam (71.0%) > Ret (54.8%) > Own (51.6%) 
Student  Own (58.1%) > Ret (32.3%) > Fam (29.0%) 
Low Income  Own (50.3%) > Fam (48.1%) > Ret (43.2%) 
Men  Own (55.3%) > Fam (44.7%) > Ret (32.9%) 
Women  Ret (52.0%) > Own (50.3%) > Fam (47.4%) 
All  Own (52.0%) > Fam (46.5%) > Ret (45.7%) 
(   ) Percentage of participants choosing this alternative. 
Observe that with the exception of the two subgroups Non-labour Force and Women, 
Option A, one’s own educational expenses, is universally preferred to the other two investment 
choices. For the Non-labour Force subgroup, investing in a family-member’s education is 
preferred by a large margin to investing in one’s own education. (This result is consistent with 
what was observed in Section 4.1.2.) With the proportions of choices close to 50 per cent, 
women appear not to have a strong preference for one investment option over the other. 
For each of the investment alternatives (in one’s own education, a family member’s education, 
and in retirement savings), the experiment included an additional way to compare the preference 
ordering of participants. A compensation question comparing $100 in cash and $600 in assets 
was asked of each participant for each investment alternative. Assuming that preferences are 
transitive — that is, if X is preferred to $100 and $100 is preferred to Y, it can be concluded that 
X is preferred to Y — subjects’ choices can be ordered, as shown below in Table 4.2. This table 
summarizes the findings from each of the three cash vs. $600 asset alternatives. If preferences 
are transitive, these results should not contradict the results presented in Table 4.1. When 
examining the Non-labour Force subpopulation category, there may appear to be an 
inconsistency. For this group, Table 4.1 suggests that B is preferred to A, and A is preferred to C 
(BAC), which does not match with the results summarized in Table 4.2. There, the Non-
labour Force subgroup exhibits preferences of the order of B preferred to C, which is preferred 
to A (BCA). This inconsistency occurs because the percentages of group preference for 
investment in A and C over cash are so close to 50 per cent that they are not distinguishable. A 
better interpretation might be that indeed the Non-labour Force subgroup has a strong 
preference for B (education of family member) and is indifferent between choices A and C (own 
education and retirement savings) (BC~A). 
In summary, when considering all subjects, a person’s own education is preferred to the other 
options, while on average subjects are indifferent in their choices between education of a family 
member and retirement savings. For the Non-labour Force participants, the comparison is 
clearer; education of a family member dominates the other two investment options. The 
Students participants favour their own education over retirement savings or the education of a 
family member. Further discussion of the investment preferences will resume with the regression 
analyses and policy implications in sections 6 and 7. Descriptive statistics for each investment-
preference question are presented in Appendix B. 
 
23 4.3 Definitions and descriptive statistics on time preference and attitude 
towards risk 
It is well known that impatience and attitude toward risk influence both the decisions to invest 
in human capital and to save for future consumption. In this section, data from the experiment 
are used to construct measures of time preference and attitude towards risk. While these 
measures are of interest in themselves, they will also be used later in Section 6 as explanatory 
variables in a regression analysis of investment and savings decisions. 
Existing experimental research on patience has provided economists with important stylized facts 
that have changed the way economists think about preferences over time. The standard economics 
model assumes that a person’s preferences are time-consistent. That is, a person will make the 
same choice no matter when he or she is asked. In contrast, experimental work discussed in 
Loewenstein & Thaler (1989) shows the decisions of many individuals exhibit hyperbolic 
discounting. Hyperbolic discounting implies that individuals are inconsistent in their time 
preferences in a specific way, showing little willingness to delay gratification in the short run, 
relative to their long-run preference to act patiently. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000) sum this 
concept up nicely, “In other words, people have self-control problems caused by a tendency to 
pursue immediate gratification in a way that their ‘long-run selves’ do not appreciate.” (pp. 4–5) 
They use the term present-biased preferences to describe this type of time-inconsistency to capture the 
qualitative nature of the preferences without implying the specific hyperbolic functional form.  
For an illustration of the concept of time-inconsistency, consider two questions from the 
experiment. Question 19 asked subjects to choose either A, $73.35 the day after the experiment, 
or B, $74.05 two days later than Choice A. Question 26 asked subjects to choose either A, 
$73.35 two weeks from the day of the experiment, or B, $74.05 two days later than Choice A. If 
subjects were time-consistent they would choose either A to both questions or B to both questions. 
If subjects were time-inconsistent they would choose A for one question and B for the other. 
Subjects would exhibit the specific type of time-inconsistency that corresponds to present-biased 
preferences if they chose the earliest payoff, A, for the first question and later payoff, B, for the 
second question. In other words, they would be willing to commit to saving $73.35 two weeks 
from the day of the experiment, but they would not be willing to save $73.35 immediately. 
Understanding a population’s time preference is key to tailoring a savings program for them. 
Individuals who have present-biased preferences would like to commit themselves to save more in the 
future, but in the absence of a self-binding instrument they will have trouble doing so. Laibson, 
Repetto, and Tobacman (1998) and Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and Weinberg 
(2001) give many examples of the existence of such self-binding instruments, such as excess 
withholding as a forced saving device, Christmas clubs, vacation clubs, savings bonds, and other 
low interest, low liquidity goal clubs to regulate saving flows. The existence of these types of 
plans implies that decision-makers adopt measures to control their own impatience. These 
present-biased individuals need pre-commitment in order to save.  
Table 4.3 defines various time preference measures and their respective values for the 
population of subjects and the main subgroups. 
 

























































































Note:  Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations for the corresponding averages. 
IMPATIENT CHOICES: Number of choices of the earliest payoff from the time preference questions. Maximum is 37. (Uses all questions 
in Table 3.2.) 
PREFERENCE FOR TODAY: A measure of the extreme preference for a payoff on the day of the experiment. This measure could also 
be an indication for present-biased behaviour. The variable is constructed as the number of times a subject has simultaneously chosen the 
early choice (today) on questions 7, 29, 30, and 32 and the alternative payoff for the corresponding questions 33, 35, 36, and 1. These paired 
questions were identical except for the timing of the early payoffs. For questions 7, 29, 30, 32, the early payoff is today. For questions 33, 35, 
36, and 1, the early payoff is tomorrow. The maximum value for this variable is 4. A value close to zero would indicate that subjects did not 
have an exceptional preference for payoff the day of the experiment. (See Table 3.2 for question description.) 
PRESENT-BIASED CHOICES: A measure of present-biased behaviour. A present-biased individual would choose the earliest payoff as it 
draws near and would choose the later payoff when the choices are positioned further in the future. This variable is constructed as the 
number of times a subject has simultaneously chosen the earliest alternative, A, for a reference set of questions and the later alternative, B, for 
two corresponding sequences of comparison questions (set further in the future). For comparison pairs, these questions varied only by the 
initial offer time. The rate of return, days lapsed, and alternative payoffs were identical. One point is contributed to this measure each time a 
subject simultaneously chooses the earliest alternative, A, for reference questions 19, 11,14, 21, and 18, and the later alternative, B, for 
corresponding sequences of questions 20, 22, 15, 24, and 25, and 26, 16, 5, 25, and 23, respectively. The maximum value for this variable is 
10. A high value indicates present-biased behaviour. (See Table 3.2 for question description.) 
The time preference variable, IMPATIENT CHOICES, is a simple count of the number of times 
the subject has chosen the earliest payoff in the time preference compensated questions described in 
Table 3.2. The range of this variable is from 0 to 37. A high value of IMPATIENT CHOICES 
suggests that under any situations with respect to payoffs, discount rates, and time delays, the subject 
strongly prefers the earlier consumption to a delayed consumption. PREFERENCE FOR TODAY 
is simply a measure of the subject’s preference for a payoff on the day of the experiment. There was 
a concern that subjects might exhibit inconsistent behaviour with regard to the timing of the choice 
when “today” was considered part of the payoff. A present-biased individual will choose the earlier 
time more often, as the decision is closer to the present time. As constructed, the maximum value 
for this variable is 4. From the mean values obtained for all groups, one can flatly reject the idea that 
the subjects have, on average, a strong preference for payoffs that are the day of the experiment. In 
addition, PRESENT-BIASED CHOICES indicates that subjects nearly always choose the early 
choice regardless of the timing of the choice. This supports the conclusion that on average this 
group does not exhibit present-biased behaviour; instead, these subjects exhibit behaviour best 
described by consistent exponential discounting.  
Figure 4.9 shows how the IMPATIENT CHOICES index is distributed among subjects. Five per 
cent of participants (13 subjects) exhibited the most patient behaviour in the experiment with 
IMPATIENT CHOICES = 0, while fifteen per cent of the participants (43 subjects) chose the 
earliest payoff regardless of payoff, discount rates, or time delays. In short, 20 per cent of the 
subjects were not affected by the parameters of the experiment. A 380 per cent rate of return was 
not enough to induce 15 per cent of the sample to save, and a 10 per cent rate of return was not too 
 
25 low to discourage 5 per cent of the sample to save. Eighty per cent of the subjects were affected by 
the parameters of the experiment. Their behaviours, described by a value between 0 and 37, were 
affected by the discount rate offered, the time delay of the alternative payoff, and the absolute dollar 
difference between the initial payoff and the alternative payoff. This variation is explained in Section 
5.1.1 and Table 5.2.  
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The role of attitudes toward risk in decisions to invest in human capital also needs to be better 
understood. Attitude towards risk may be affected by income level. It seems reasonable that low-
income individuals would be more risk averse than high-income individuals because of 
diminishing marginal utility of income, that is, diminishing marginal utility of income means that 
the higher the income, the less value attributed to each additional dollar of income. It is generally 
believed that there is a positive relationship between risk aversion and the investment in human 
capital (Kodde, 1986). In other words, theoretically, individuals who are risk averse are more 
likely to invest in education than those who are risk loving. Presumably the working poor are 
risk averse because of their low income, yet they invest little in human capital. A subsistence 
level of income leaves little for investment, regardless of risk attitudes.  
Table 4.4 defines the measures of attitude towards risk and their respective values for the 
population of subjects and the main subgroups. LESS RISKY CHOICES is a simple count of 
the number of times the subject has chosen the less risky lottery in the 14 pairs of choices 
described in Table 3.3. There was some concern that these risk questions may have confused 
some subjects. Two additional measures were created using two progressively less complicated 
subsets of the risk questions. LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES and SAFE CHOICES also count, 
for each subject, the number of times the less risky choice was made. For LESS RISKY 50/50 
CHOICES, the count used only compensation questions that had a safe (certain) choice vs. a 
50/50 choice. There were five such questions. For SAFE CHOICES, the 11 compensation 
questions that had a safe choice (payoff with probability of 1) for the less risky alternative were 
the basis for the count. 
 
26   Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics — Aggregate Measures of Attitude Towards Risk 
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LESS RISKY CHOICES: The number of times of the less risky lottery was chosen. Maximum is 14. (See questions 38 to 51 in Table 3.3.) 
LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES: The number of times the less risky lottery was chosen. Only questions with a 50/50 trade-off for the 
more risky choice were used for this index. Maximum is 5. (See questions 38, 39, 46, 47, and 49 in Table 3.3.) 
SAFE CHOICES: The number of times of the less risky lottery was chosen. Only less risky lotteries with certain outcomes were used for 
this index. Maximum is 11. (See questions 38 to 43 and 46 to 50, Table 3.3) 
Mean values of these variables across subgroups suggest that on average these subjects were risk 
averse. None of the measures suggested a difference in risk attitudes among subpopulations. 
Interestingly, 16 per cent of the sample always chose the least risky lottery. A smaller proportion 
of subjects, two per cent, always chose the risky lottery alternative.  
Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B summarize the overall response of participants to each 
compensation question relating to time preference and attitude toward risk.  
 
27 5 Subjects’ Preference for the Present and Attitude Toward Risk 
This section examines the factors that affect the subjects’ time preference and attitude towards 
risk. As will be shown in Section 6, both time preference and attitude towards risk variables have 
an effect on the investment preference decisions of the participants. It is important, therefore, to 
explore the factors or contextual situations that may influence one’s level of patience or 
tolerance of risk. 
5.1 Factors affecting patience 
The dependent variable in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression summarized in Table 5.1 
is the number of times each subject opted for the earliest payoff in responding to the 37 time 
preference compensation questions (IMPATIENT CHOICES). The independent variables listed 
in the first column are demographic characteristics that affect IMPATIENT CHOICES. 
Table 5.1: Determinants of the Number of Earliest Payoff Choices for the Time Preference 
Questions for Each Individual (Ordinary Least Squares, Impatient Choices) 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  25.63*** 9.43 
Age  -0.1429* -1.96 
Male  3.203* 1.98 
Number of children
a  0.6548 0.822 
2 R = 0.023; 256 observations 
Bolded values indicate coefficients statistically significant on the 10 per cent level, * indicates a 5 per cent level, ** indicates a 1 per 
cent level, and *** indicates a 0.1 per cent level.  
aOther social and demographic variables, Labour force, Non-labour force, Student, Low income and Lottery, included in this 
regression but not summarized here were also not significant. 
Younger subjects and men showed greater impatience, favouring the earliest choices more 
frequently. Women were more patient than the men in the sample, choosing to accept the later 
alternative for three more decisions on average than men. The number of children in the 
household did not appear to affect patience. The variation that is present in IMPATIENT 
CHOICES is not well explained by the socio-economic and demographic variables. The analysis 
now turns to an examination of the experimental parameters of each time preference question 
and how those question characteristics may impact behaviour. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the effect the time preference experimental parameters had on the choices 
the subjects made. The percentage of subjects that chose the earliest payoff for the 37 time 
preference questions was used as the dependent variable. Delaying the alternative payoff reduced 
the incentive to pick the later payoff. However, increasing the rate of return induced more 
patient behaviour from the subjects. It is interesting to note that in addition to the relative 
difference, the absolute difference between payoffs encouraged the subjects to delay their 
reward. The variable Today was included in this regression to test whether subjects were 
attracted by payoffs that were offered the day of the experiment. They were not. 
 
29 Table 5.2: Factors Affecting the Percentage of Participants Choosing the Earliest Payoff 
Choices for Each Time Preference Question (Logistic Specification) 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  0.9678*** 8.06 
Days Lapsed
a  0.04135*** 4.69 
Today
b 0.1390  0.854 
Absolute Return
c  -0.1369*** -6.09 
Rate of Return
d  -0.002221*** -4.80 
2 R = 0.817; 37 observations 
Bolded values and *** indicate coefficients statistically significant on the 0.1 per cent level.  
aDays Lapsed is the number of days between the early payoff and later payoff. 
bToday is 1 if payoff is the day of the survey; 0 otherwise. 
cAbsolute Return is the absolute difference between payoffs (Later Payoff - Early Payoff). 
dRate of Return is the annualized rate of return for waiting for later payoff. 
(See Table 3.2 for a summary of the time preference questions.) 
The results summarized in Table 5.3 are obtained by blending the points summarized in the two 
previous tables. The determinants of choosing the earliest payoff are analyzed by using a pooled 
probit by subjects with all the time preference questions. In a random effects model there is an 
error term with two components: εij and ui. The εij is the usual error term unique to each 
observation. ui  is an error term specific to the individual constant term (an individual effect) and 
assumed to be randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. The significance of the 
coefficient Rho in Table 5.2 indicates that individual effects do exist. Among the factors 
included are the subpopulations and interaction variables of populations with the key parameters 
or contextual situations of the time preference compensation questions.  
Table 5.3: Characteristics and Factors for Choosing the Earliest Payoff — Preference for 
the Present (Random Effects Probit With Pooled Data: 9,472 Observations*) 
 Variable 
 Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  0.7257***  3.73 
Age  -0.01655***  -5.86 
Male  0.3159***  5.58 
Number of Children  0.01781  0.555 
Labour Force  0.2708  1.90 
Non-labour Force  -0.3699*  -2.26 
Student  -0.8775***  -5.33 
Low Income  0.6818***  10.50 
Lottery
a  -0.3036***  -4.81 
Days Lapsed
b  0.03055***  11.20 
Today
c  0.1987**  3.20 
Absolute Return
d  -0.1021***  -15.19 
Rho  0.6167***  44.07 
Loglikelihood   -4,177.28  
Restricted loglikelihood  -6,106.11   
* Corresponds to 37 questions by 256 participants. 
Bolded values indicate coefficients statistically significant on the 10 per cent level, * indicates a 5 per cent level, ** indicates a 1 per 
cent level, and *** indicates a 0.1 per cent level.  
aLottery is 1 if the subject bought lottery tickets on a regular basis; 0 otherwise. 
bDays Lapsed is the number of days between the earlier payoff and the alternative. 
cToday is 1 if payoff is the day of the survey; 0 otherwise. 
dAbsolute Return is the absolute difference between payoffs. 
 
30   As in the previous regressions, older subjects and women were more likely to be patient. In 
general, the same can be said for the Non-labour Force subgroup and the Student subgroups. 
Note that the Low Income subgroup was less likely to be patient and wait for a return to 
savings. 
5.2 Factors affecting risk preference 
The determinants of choosing the less risky lotteries are presented with the pooled probits in 
Table 5.4. The pooling is by subject across the relevant risk preference questions. 
Table 5.4: Determinants of Choosing the Less Risky Lotteries  
(Random Effects Probits With Pooled Data) 
 Dependent  Variable 
Independent Variable  Less Risky Choices
a  Less Risky 50/50 Choices
a 




Labour Force  0.3658 
(1.01)   
0.4822 
(0.925)   
Non-labour Force  0.2747 
(0.714)   
0.5341 
(0.966)   
Student 0.1843 
(0.465) 
  0.4743 
(0.855)  

















c  1.052 
(9.34) 
***  1.5438 
(6.24) 
*** 
Rho  0.4284 
(15.49) 
***  0.4994 
(11.27) 
*** 
Loglikelihood -1,881.41    -722.82   
Restricted loglikelihood  -2,161.29    -802.33   
Number of observations  3,584, (14 x 256)    1,280, (5 x 256)   
t-statistics are below each coefficient in parentheses. Bolded values and *** indicate coefficients statistically significant on 
the 0.1 per cent level. 
aA 0–1 discrete variable is constructed with the questions in LESS RISKY CHOICES and LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES 
variables (see Table 3.3). 
bLottery is 1 if subject bought lottery tickets on a regular basis; 0 otherwise. 
cRisk is the difference in the coefficients of variation (standard error/mean) between a pair of lotteries. A higher value of 
Risk means a higher difference in the level of risk between a pair of lotteries. 
Two measures of risk preference, LESS RISKY CHOICES and LESS RISKY 50/50 
CHOICES, are retained and yield essentially the same results. The Risk variable measures the 
difference in the level of risk between a pair of lotteries. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient estimate on this variable clearly suggests that the higher the difference in the level of 
risk between a pair of lotteries, the greater the probability for the subject to choose the less risky 
lottery. The Lottery variable, which was an indication of whether individuals purchased lottery 
 
31 tickets on a regular basis, was included in this regression but it was not statistically significant. 
The behaviour of buying lottery tickets does not correlate with the behaviour of avoiding risky 
monetary payoffs. Recall that Table 4.4 highlighted the low variability in either of these measures 
of risk preference across subgroups of the population. Therefore, it is not surprising that none 
of the coefficients for the subpopulation variables yielded a statistically significant estimate.
 
32   6 Analysis of Investment Decisions 
Given the right incentive, will the working poor save? In this experiment, the decision to save is 
represented by a choice to forego cash offered by the experimenter to invest in one’s own 
human capital, a family member’s education, or retirement savings. For one’s own educational 
expenditures, descriptive statistics shown earlier indicate that the proportion of subjects 
choosing the cash amount decreases from 77 per cent to 56 per cent and 45 per cent when the 
trade-off for a $100 cash prize increases from $200 in educational expenses to $400 and $600, 
respectively. These descriptive results suggest, for a proposed match rate on one type of 
investment, the expected behaviour from a particular part of the population.  
This section continues the investigation into the components of the investment decision. 
Regression analysis is used to simultaneously take into account the many factors that may 
influence an individual’s preference for assets. Demographic, behavioural, attitudinal, and 
treatment variables will be considered. For instance, it is generally accepted that risk-averse 
persons are more likely to invest in human capital than risk lovers because schooling reduces the 
variance of expected income (Kodde, 1986). Such an investigation should also reveal the 
relationship between time preference and investment decision. On average, an impatient 
participant would be expected to have a smaller preference for investment of any kind than 
would a patient participant. 
6.1 Analysis of investment in human capital 
This section begins with a discussion of the preference for investment in one’s own education. 
Consider four categories of investment preference for human capital: no preference for 
investment, some preference for investment, strong preference for investment, and very strong 
preference for investment. The latent variable  captures the preference of individual i to 
invest in his or her own education. The following ordered probit has been estimated using a 




i i i X IE ε β + =
*  
The preference for human capital investment is not directly observed, but whether the subjects 
have chosen education when faced with three different trade-offs between cash and educational 
expenses has been observed. As a reminder, each subject made three choices during the 
experiment: $100 in cash vs. $200 in educational expenses, $100 in cash vs. $400 in educational 
expenses, and $100 in cash vs. $600 in educational expenses. Let the observed counterpart of the 
latent variable   be defined as:   if a participant never chose education for any trade-
off;   if education was chosen when $600 was offered in educational expenses (1 to 5 
match rate);   if education was chosen by the participant when at least $400 was offered 
in educational expenses (at least a 1 to 3 match rate); and finally,   if education was always 
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The probability of participant ichoosing human capital investment only when a 1 to 5 match 
rate is offered is  
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Similarly, the probability of choosing education only when there is at least a 1 to 3 match rate is 
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And finally, the probability of participant ialways choosing education is 
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For all probabilities to be positive, there must be 0 < δ1 < δ2.
1 The δ’s are unknown parameters 
to be estimated with β. The estimation results for the ordered probit are reported in Table 6.1. 
Observe that the threshold parameters δ1 and δ2 are statistically significant and positive. This 
means that different match rates offered to potential learn$ave account holders will induce 
different response rates. On the other hand, if these coefficients were not significant, then that 
would imply that the target population is insensitive to differences in match rates.  
Older persons are more likely to choose the cash, reflecting the smaller time period available for 
recouping their investment in human capital. The effects of sex, number of children, and income 
levels are insignificant; that is, these factors do not enter into the determination of the 
investment in human capital. It is important to note that many of the subjects were below or 
near the LICOs and this result may simply indicate that individuals near the LICOs, whether 
above or below, act in a similar manner.  
Greater impatience results in a greater probability of choosing cash over human capital. This is 
consistent with the Becker-Mincer’s theory of human capital. 
It is generally accepted that risk-averse persons are more likely to invest in human capital than risk 
lovers because schooling reduces the variance of expected income (Kodde, 1986). However, in this 
experiment, more risk-averse subjects show a lower probability to invest in human capital. It may 
be that risk attitudes in the context of human capital accumulation are not captured well by the 
LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES variable.
2 If the context of the LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES 
 
1The ordered probit specification is summarized in Greene’s (1993) econometric text.  
 
34   
2If attitudes toward risk are highly contextual, then the LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES variable may not capture attitudes 
towards risk relevant to the question of human capital accumulation. Another available measure of attitude toward risk is the 
self-described behaviour of purchasing lottery tickets. The working poor often participate in lottery games, an action that (cont’d) variable is similar to that of the risk involved in investing in education, then perhaps an 
explanation for this observation is that the subjects of this experiment have endured many failures: 
failures in the labour market, school, and their marital situation. Investing in human capital implies 
a risk that they may want to avoid in order to steer clear of another possibility of failure.  
Table 6.1: Determinants of Choosing Educational Expenses Over Cash  
(Ordered Probit, 240 Observations) 
Specification    
Constant  1.473
(2.35) 
  * 
1 δ   0.3104
(5.31) 
  *** 
2 δ   0.9697
(9.81) 
  *** 
Age  -0.02140
(-2.71) 
  ** 
Male 0.06993 
(0.396) 
Number of Children  0.0203 
(0.236) 













IMPATIENT CHOICES  -0.3082
(-4.17) 
  *** 
LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES  -0.08789 
(-1.64) 
Loglikelihood -280.813 
Restricted loglikelihood   -303.28 
t-statistics are below each coefficient in parentheses. Bolded values indicate coefficients statistically significant on the 10 per 
cent level, * indicates a 5 per cent level, ** indicates a 1 per cent level, and *** indicates a 0.1 per cent level.  
aLocus of Control is the Locus of Control index (0–7). A lower value indicates that the subject has strong feelings of self-
efficacy. (Internal = 0, External =7) 
bSchooling (years) is the number of years of schooling.  
cFinancial Responsibility is the Financial Responsibility index (e.g. keeping track of expenses, maintaining a written budget, 
and making regular contributions to a savings account. A higher value indicates more financial responsibility. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
35 
is normally associated with risk-seeking attitudes. A majority of participants in this experiment (72 per cent) bought lottery 
tickets on at least an occasional basis. This would indicate that there is some aspect of risk-seeking behaviour among the target 
population. However, the purchase of a lottery ticket does not easily compare to the risks endured by seeking to increase one’s 
human capital. The poor might be willing to gamble small amounts for the possibility of a gain large enough to escape from 
poverty, yet be unwilling to invest a more substantial amount for an uncertain, more modest gain. The gambles presented in the 
experiment are similar to the high stakes gambles of investing in education in that the stakes are larger and the gains are more 
modest. Subjects with a higher levels of schooling have a greater probability of choosing investment in 
education, as shown with the positive, statistically significant coefficient estimate on the number-
of-school-year variable (Schooling[years]). That is, subjects who have already chosen to invest in 
their own human capital may be better able to assess the benefits of education. This result may 
also be due to selection; individuals for whom the returns to education are high may both invest 
in their own education and choose to invest additional amounts in education in the context of 
the experiment. 
The other behavioural variables are not significantly related to the decision to choose cash  
over education, and their addition does not change the pattern of results observed in previous 
models. 
In a probit model it is well known that the marginal effects of the regressors on the  
probabilities are not equal to the coefficients. Based on the subjects’ responses, we can  
calculate the probability to invest in education for the different subsets of the population.  
Table 6.2 summarizes the resulting probabilities of simulations run for different subgroups.  
The results were obtained in the following manner: The probability was computed for each 
individual to be in each of the four categories of behaviour (Never, Once, Twice, Always 
Chose Educational Expenses). Then, for a specific characteristic (Male, Low Income, Age),  
an average conditional probability with a standard deviation for each was computed.  
For example, on average, 45.72 per cent of men have a strong preference for cash over  
educational expenses, 10.78 will choose education only when the match rate is 5 to 1,  
20.41 per cent will choose educational expenses only when the match rate is at least  
3 to 1, and 23.09 per cent will choose educational expenses no matter what the match rate 
offered (as long as it is at least 1 to 1). Note that these average conditional probabilities  
sum to 1. 
These results show that the level of impatience and the attitude towards risk both play an 
important role in the human capital investment decision. Note the dramatic change in the 
probability of investment from subjects who exhibited relatively patient behaviour 
(IMPATIENT CHOICES ≤ 10) to subjects who exhibited relatively impatient behaviour 
(30 < IMPATIENT CHOICES) for the extreme investment preference category of Never. 
On average, about 61 per cent of the least patient subjects never chose to invest in education 
compared with only about 25 per cent of the more patient subjects. A substantial reduction in 
the impatience level would greatly improve the probability of choosing an investment in 
education. To a lesser degree than impatience, attitude towards risk is also an important factor 
in the investment decision. On average, about 50 per cent of the more risk averse subjects 
have a strong preference for cash over educational expenses whereas only 35 per cent of the 
less risk averse subjects exhibit this tendency. 
It is interesting to note that the standard deviations are low in columns 2 and 3 for each 
conditional characteristic. This suggests that the incentive effects of the match rates are very 
strong, as all participants respond to changes in the generosity of the incentive.  
The results summarized in the last row of the table, “All,” compare directly to Figure 4.1 in 
Section 4. These average probabilities are unconditional on specific characteristics of participants 
and show the influence of the threshold parameters or match rates. 
 
 
36   Table 6.2: Simulation of the Probability of Investing in Education (240 Observations) 
  Never 
( ) 0 Pr = i IE  
Once 
  () 1 Pr = i IE
Twice 
  () 2 Pr = i IE
Always 
( ) 3 Pr = i IE  
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37 6.2 Analysis of investment in family member’s education 
This section focuses on the preference of investment in the education of a family member. Just 
as the investment decision was modeled in Section 6.1, the latent variable  captures the 
preference of individual   to invest in a family member’s education. The following ordered 
probit was estimated using a number of demographic and behavioural characteristics, listed in 




i i i X IF ε β + =
*  
The preference for investment in a family member’s education is not directly observed, but 
whether the subjects have chosen education when faced with the three different levels of cash 
and a family member’s education trade-offs has been observed. The observed counterpart of the 
latent variable   is defined as follows:   if a participant never chose education for a 
family member for any trade-off offered;   if education was chosen when $600 was 
offered in educational expenses (1 to 5 match rate);   if education was chosen by the 
participant when at least a 1 to 3 match rate was offered (that is $500 in education vs. $166 cash 
or $600 in education vs. $100 cash); and, finally,   if education was always the revealed 
choice of the participant for any offer of educational expenses. 
*
i IF 0 = i IF
1 = i IF
2 = i IF
3 = i IF
As with the previous regression, the results show again that the threshold parameters are 
statistically significant and positive, indicating that subjects are responsive to the “price” of 
investing. The number of children strongly affects this decision; people with children are 
substantially more likely to choose education of a family member. The interaction of Male with 
years of schooling (Schooling*Male) carries a negative coefficient, indicating that men with more 
schooling are actually more likely to choose cash over investment in a family member’s 
education. 
Subjects with a high sense of control over their lives (Locus of Control) are more likely to take 
the cash alternative over investment in family education. Those with a strong preference for the 
present (IMPATIENT CHOICES) will again favour choosing the cash option. Contrary to the 
previous probit regression, attitude toward risk does not play a role in the choice to invest in a 
family member’s education. This is in accordance with the interpretation given earlier to this 
variable with respect to investing in one’s own education: the education of a family member 
does not create a risky situation for the subject, as such. 
In Table 6.4, simulations for different subgroups are summarized. 
Note the differences in probabilities for investment in family members education for subjects 
who exhibited relatively impatient behaviour (30< IMPATIENT CHOICES). Those individuals 
were far less likely to invest in family member’s education. Even when the match rate was most 
favourable, 1 to 5, on average close to 64 per cent of the least patient subjects would choose 
cash over the investment option and on average about 16 per cent would choose the investment 
option when the match rate was 1 to 1. 
The results of the last line, “All,” are unconditional on specific characteristics of participants and 
show the influence of the threshold parameters or match rates. These probabilities compare 
directly to Figure 4.1 (bottom half) in Section 4. 
 
38   Table 6.3: Determinants of Choosing Education of a Family Member Over Cash  
(Ordered Probit, 242 Observations) 
Specification*    
Constant   1.739 
(1.40) 
 
δ1  0.3676 
(5.65) 
*** 











a  0.3863 
(4.06) 
*** 
Low Income  0.1414 
(0.740) 
 
























d  0.4378 
(1.67) 
 
IMPATIENT CHOICES  -0.02919 
(-4.02) 
*** 
LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES  -0.01870 
(-0.339) 
 
Loglikelihood -256.28   
Restricted loglikelihood  -287.42   
*Alternative specifications were estimated. The model presented here is the most preferred. 
t-statistics are below each coefficient in parentheses. Bolded values indicate coefficients statistically significant on the 10 per 
cent level, * indicates a 5 per cent level, ** indicates a 1 per cent level, and *** indicates a 0.1 per cent level.  
aThere was an alternative specification that included the independent variable “Single Parent” rather than the variables 
“Male” and “Number of Children.” (With the exception of two cases, female subjects head the single-parent households in 
the sample.)  
bLocus of Control is the Locus of Control index (0–7). A lower value indicates that the subject has strong feelings of self-
efficacy. (Internal = 0, External =7) 
cSchooling (years) is the number of years of schooling.  
dFor Black Organization a value of 1 indicates participants associated with a black organization; 0 if no affiliation. This is 
the closest approximation to a variable of visible minority status with the existing data. 
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40   6.3 Analysis of investment in retirement savings 
Under what conditions do the subjects save for their retirement? Table 6.5 reviews the 
determinants of the probability that subjects will choose the cash option over the alternative of 
saving for their retirement. As the investment decision was modeled in sections 6.1 and 6.2, the 
latent variable  captures the preference for the propensity of individual i to invest in 
retirement savings. The following ordered probit was estimated using a number of demographic 
and behavioural characteristics listed in Table 6.5 as independent variables: 
*
i IR
i i i X IR ε β + =
*  
The preference for investment in retirement is not directly observed, but whether the subjects 
chose retirement savings when offered the choice of three different levels of cash or retirement 
savings has been determined. The observed counterpart of the latent variable   is defined as 
follows:   if a participant never chooses retirement savings for any trade-off offered; 
 if retirement savings were chosen when $600 was offered in retirement savings (1 to 5 
match rate);   if retirement savings were chosen by the participant when at least a 1 to 3 
match rate was offered (that is, $500 in retirement savings vs. $166 cash, or $600 in retirement 
savings vs. $100 cash); and finally,   if retirement savings were always the revealed choice 
of the participant for any offer of retirement savings. 
*
i IR
0 = i IR
i IR
1 = i IR
2 =
3 = i IR
As the matching rate increases, the choice of cash over the retirement savings instrument 
diminishes, as shown by the increasing coefficients on the variables δ1 and δ2. One important 
difference between the models in sections 5.1 and 5.2 and this model concerns the substitution 
of the variable Single Parent for the variables Male and Number of Children chosen in earlier 
specifications. With the exception of two cases, female subjects head the single-parent 
households in the sample. Single-parent subjects unambiguously prefer cash to retirement 
savings. It is also observed that students, subjects with more schooling, and those that play 
lotteries are more likely to take the cash option. Subjects that keep track of their expenses 
(Financial Responsibility) are more likely to choose the retirement savings option. This last result 
suggests that saving seems to be facilitated when subjects operate in a structured budgeting 
environment. As anticipated, subjects declaring to contribute to a retirement plan (Retirement 
Plan) also favour the retirement savings option. Finally, subjects reporting to have an association 
with a community group (Community Organization) have a higher probability of choosing the 
retirement savings option over the cash option. 
Impatient subjects are more likely to take the cash alternative, as are more risk-averse subjects. 
The coefficient estimate of LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES suggests that more risk-averse 
subjects are more likely to choose the cash option. To the extent that the monetary-gamble 
compensation questions that construct the LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES variable represent an 
adequate evaluation of the risk attitudes of the subjects, it may be that an increased level of risk 
aversion keeps them from investing in their retirement savings. Perhaps they view the many 
different situations that can arise during the seven years of fixed deposit as too risky, leading the 
subjects to prefer the smaller value of certain cash in the very near future to the somewhat 
certain benefit seven years in the future. 
 
 
41 Table 6.5: Determinants of Choosing Retirement Savings Over Cash  
(Ordered Probit, 244 Observations) 
Specification    
Constant  2.748 
(2.25) 
*** 
δ1  0.3359 
(4.92) 
*** 
δ2  0.8053 
(7.26) 
*** 




a   -0.2976 
(-2.04) 
* 
Low Income  0.09260 
(0.453) 
 




































IMPATIENT CHOICES  -0.04046 
(-4.97) 
*** 
LESS RISKY 50/50 CHOICES  -0.1511 
(-2.49) 
* 
Loglikelihood -227.45   
Restricted loglikelihood  -280.60  
t-statistics are below each coefficient in parentheses. Bolded values indicate coefficients statistically significant on the 10 per 
cent level, * indicates a 5 per cent level, ** indicates a 1 per cent level, and *** indicates a 0.1 per cent level.  
aSingle Parent is participants who responded that they had children and did not have marriage or common-law marital status. 
bLocus of Control is the Locus of Control index (0–7). A lower value indicates that the subject has strong feelings of self-
efficacy. (Internal = 0, External =7) 
cSchooling (years) is the number of years of schooling.  
dFinancial Responsibility is the Financial Responsibility index (e.g. keeping track of expenses, maintaining a written budget, and 
making regular contributions to a savings account. A higher value indicates more financial responsibility. 
eRetirement Plan is 1 if the subject currently maintains a retirement savings; 0 otherwise. 
fLottery is 1 if the subject bought lottery tickets on a regular basis; 0 otherwise. 
 
42   Table 6.6 summarizes the probabilities of preference behaviour for different subgroups. 
Table 6.6: Simulation of the Probability of Investing for Retirement 
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43 Table 6.6: Simulation of the Probability of Investing for Retirement (Cont’d) 
  Never 
( ) 0 Pr = i IE  
Once 
  () 1 Pr = i IE
Twice 
  () 2 Pr = i IE
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These simulations confirm the observations from the regression that were summarized in 
Table 6.5. Specifically, note the probabilities associated with the participants that reported no 
affiliation with community groups (No Community Organization). Seventy-three per cent of 
those individuals, on average, have a strong preference for cash over retirement savings. Those 
that exhibited a high level of impatience (30 < IMPATIENT CHOICES) and risk aversion had 
similar probabilities of strong preference for cash of 75 per cent and 60 per cent. On the other 
hand, on average 50 per cent of patient subjects (IMPATIENT CHOICES ≤ 10) and 43 per 
cent of those that already have a retirement plan had a strong preference for retirement savings, 
giving up $250 in cash for a $500 GIC. 
 
44   7 Summary and Conclusion 
The laboratory experiment focused on three main questions:  
(1) Will the working poor invest in various assets?  
A sizable proportion of the working poor would invest in assets, one’s own education, family 
member’s education, and retirement savings, if the investment were subsidized. The more the 
investment was subsidized, the more likely individuals were to invest. When subjects were 
presented with the opportunity analogous to the IDA learn$ave matching offer ($400 in 
educational expenses or $100 in cash), 44 per cent of subjects accepted the offer of education 
and training. Because these results entail giving up “house money” rather than their own earned 
income, they are likely to slightly overstate their willingness to forego current income for an 
investment in education. It is worth noting that for some people, investment in any form of 
asset seems to have been virtually ruled out: 16 per cent of the subjects indicated no preference 
for any of the investment alternatives, even when the rate of return approached 500 per cent. 
Not surprisingly, the subpopulation that was most responsive to the match rates for one’s own 
education was the student subpopulation. The non-labour force participants were the most 
responsive to investing in a family member’s education. With a 1 to 1 match rate, over half of 
them would be willing to invest in a family member’s education. Non-labour force participants 
preferred a family member’s education as an investment option to that of their own education or 
retirement savings. All other subpopulations, including the sample as a whole, preferred the 
option of investing in their own education to the other two investment alternatives: retirement 
savings and a family member’s education. 
(2) Are these subjects willing to delay consumption for substantial returns?  
Many subjects were willing to delay consumption for substantial returns. Subjects were asked if 
they preferred to receive their payment early or later. Later payments were rewarded by a higher 
payoff. For the subjects of the experiment, taking the later payoff is analogous to saving. The 
subject must forego current consumption to receive future consumption. Delaying the 
alternative payoff reduced the incentive to pick the later alternative even when the rate of return 
was held constant. In addition to the relative difference, the absolute difference between payoffs 
encouraged the subjects to delay their reward. More research is warranted, but as they stand 
these results suggest that savings programs that allow frequent withdrawals (to accelerate reward) 
and stress absolute difference in monetary gains as well as rate of return will fare much better 
than those that do not. 
(3) How do these subjects view risky choices?  
 When the stakes were high, these subjects were risk averse. Many of the subjects participated in 
lottery games, an action that is normally associated with risk-seeking attitudes. The risk measures 
developed in this paper were not correlated to whether subjects bought lottery tickets. This mix 
of evidence suggests that attitudes toward risk might be more contextual than is often thought. 
In this experiment, the context of the monetary gambles offered as choices to the subjects had 
substantial stakes to be risked ($60 to $120) for uncertain modest gains. This is perhaps a better 
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observation of behaviour towards lottery ticket purchases. 
The answers to these questions inform the larger question: Will the working poor save to invest 
in human capital? The more patient participants were, the more likely they were to invest in their 
own education. The more risk-averse subjects were, the less likely they were to invest in their 
own education. These subjects viewed foregoing certain cash in exchange for a multiple of that 
cash in educational expenses as a risky alternative. Note that the subjects of this experiment have 
endured many failures: in the labour market, in school, and in their marital situation. In addition, 
younger subjects and those that already had invested in some post-secondary education were 
more likely to invest in education. Perhaps those with some post-secondary education were 
better able to assess the risk involved in an investment in education. 
The decision to invest in a family member’s education is somewhat different than that of 
investing in one’s own education. Again, patient participants were more likely to invest in a 
family member’s education, but in contrast to investing in one’s own education, a subject’s 
attitude towards risk played no role. The education of a family member does not involve a risky 
situation for the subject, as such. 
Two behavioural characteristics, patience and attitude towards risk, are key to understanding the 
determinants of educational investment for the low-income individuals in this experiment. More 
research is needed to understand the structure of the risk in investing in education and the 
factors that can induce one to be more patient in waiting for compensation. Perhaps if the 
perceived risks associated with education could be reduced, this target population would be 
more likely to invest in education. In addition, helping individuals to become more patient will 
also lead to improved investment rates for education and other investment alternatives. In the 
meantime, it is recommended that savings programs allow frequent withdrawals and stress the 
absolute level of monetary gains as well as the rate of return. Noting that those who keep track 
of their expenses and belong to community organizations are more likely to invest in retirement 
savings, it would be worthwhile to study the effect of savings groups or peer groups on the 
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Materials Related to the Experiment 










1.  You are asked to complete two questionnaires. The first questionnaire (64 questions) is made of choice 
questions. The second questionnaire (43 questions) is made of information questions. All answers will be 
treated confidentially. 
2.  You win at least $12, but you can make a great deal more. 
3. You  must  answer each question, without exception. This is the only way to win a prize. 
4.  If you have any questions once you have started answering the questionnaire, please raise your hand, and 
someone will help you. 
 
The payment procedure: 
Once you have answered all the questions in the survey, you will be invited to meet with me to determine the 
prize you win. This prize will be determined in the following manner: 
1.  A ball will be drawn randomly from an urn containing 64 balls, numbered from 1 to 64 representing all the 
choice questions of the survey. The urn does not include balls for the information questions. 
2.  The ball drawn identifies the question that determines your prize following your choice at that question.  
3.  Some monetary prizes will be given in cash, others will be mailed at a specific date. You will have to sign a 
receipt. In the cases of non-monetary prizes, you will receive an IOU certificate and your prize will be 
delivered to you by a special courier in the first weeks of January. 
 
A practice questionnaire: 
1.  To familiarise you with the types of choice questions of the survey, you are invited to answer 6 questions 
(numbered 1 to 6) of a training questionnaire.  
2.  Once this is done by all participants, we will draw a few balls from the urn to illustrate the payment procedure.  
 
   The whole survey should take less than 90 minutes to be completed.  
   Please note that there is no wrong or right answer, we want to know what YOU think. 
  








Non monetary prizes: 
 
 
Investment in your education and training: 
   This category includes expenses incurred for your own 
education and training: admission fees at an 
educational institution (professional, collegial, or 
university), purchases of didactic material (books, 
software, or others). 
   If you win this prize, we will refund your expenses made 
during the next year at any educational institutions. 
 
 
Investment in the education of a family member: 
   This category includes expenses incurred for your 
children’s (or any other family member) education: 
admission fees at an educational institution 
(professional, collegial, or university), purchases of 
didactic material (books, software, or others). 
   If you win this prize, your child (or any other family 
member) will receive a financial asset (certificate of 




Investment in your retirement plan: 
   This category is money saved for your retirement. 
   If you win this prize, you will receive a financial asset 
(certificate of deposit) bearing interests with a fixed 
maturity of 7 years. 
 
Purchase or maintenance of durable goods: 
   This category includes any expenses that you are 
planning to do in a near future (less than a year) and 
which are related to the purchase of durable goods 
(computer, electronic good, car, etc.) or to the 
maintenance of these goods (home repair, car repair, 
etc.). 







Please take a few minutes to answer the following questions. Please remember that 
all information will be kept confidential and that your name will never be associated 
with any information from the survey. 
 




2.  In what year were you born? 
  19 
  




4.  What is your current marital status? 
 Married 
 Common law 





5.  If you have any children under the age of 18 living with you at this time, please 
indicate their year of birth below: 
 child 1     child 2 
 child 3     child 4     
 child 5     child 6      
_____ 7 or more children 
 
6.  How many years of schooling have you completed? Circle one. 
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7.  Do you have any of the following educational credentials? (Please provide an 
answer for each): 
a.  A high school diploma       
1 Yes        
2 No 
b.  A  college  diploma      
1 Yes        
2 No 
c.  A trade/vocational diploma or certificate  
1 Yes        
2 No 
d.  An apprenticeship diploma     
1 Yes        
2 No 
e.  A university degree       
1 Yes        
2 No 
f.  Any other diplomas or degrees (please specify) :_____________________ 
 
8.  Have you ever been enrolled in any other kind of school such as (include both full-
time and part-time enrolment): Mark all that apply. 
 Community  college?        
  Business  school?        
 Technical institute/trade, vocational or other?   
 University?  
   
9.  Are you currently enrolled in any education or training? 
 Yes   If yes, please specify_______________________________ 
 No 
  
10. What do you consider to be your current main activity? Mark one only. 
 Caring for family 
 Working for pay or profit       
 Looking for paid work 
 Going to school 
 Household work 
 Parental leave (from paid employment) 
 Long-term illness/disability 
 Retired 
 Other, please specify______________________________________ 
 
11. Do you currently do any paid work? 
 Yes   
 No    If No, proceed to Question 16. 
  
12. In this job, are you a paid worker or self-employed? 
   Paid worker       
 Self-employed 
 Does not apply 
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13. How many weeks during the year do you work at this job or business? 
  Weeks 
 Does not apply 
 
 
14. How many days a week do you work at this job or business?  
   Days 
 Does not apply 
 
15. What is your wage or salary at this job?  Complete only one. 








16. Is there another source of income for your household?  
 Yes 
   No   
 










 over $50,000 
 
18. Do you have a budget that is written down somewhere?  
 Yes 
   No   
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19. Do you have a system for keeping track of your expenses? For example, do you keep 
track of expenses in a notebook?  
 Yes 
   No   
 
20. Do you have a savings account that you contribute to regularly?  
 Yes 
   No   
 
21. Do you have a credit card?  
 Yes 
   No   
 
22. Do you own your home? 
 Yes 
   No   
 
23. Do you own an automobile?  
 Yes 
   No   
  
24. Generally speaking, do you feel: 
 most people can be trusted? 
 you can’t be too careful when dealing with people? 
 
25. If you lost a wallet or purse that contained $200.00, how likely is it to be returned 
with the money in it if it was found by someone who lives close by?  
 Very likely 
 Somewhat likely 
 Not likely at all 
 Don’t know  
 
26. If you lost a wallet or purse that contained $200.00, how likely is it to be returned 
with the money in it if it was found by a clerk at the grocery store where you do most 
of your shopping?  
 Very likely 
 Somewhat likely 
 Not likely at all 
 Don’t know  
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27. If you lost a wallet or purse that contained $200.00, how likely is it to be returned 
with the money in it if it was found by a police officer?  
 Very likely 
 Somewhat likely 
 Not likely at all 
 Don’t know  
 
28. If you lost a wallet or purse that contained $200.00, how likely is it to be returned 
with the money in it if it was found by a complete stranger?  
 Very likely 
 Somewhat likely 
 Not likely at all 
 Don’t know  
 
29. Do you buy lottery tickets? 
 Yes, every week         If weekly, how many per week? ____________        
 Yes, occasionally 
 Yes, very rarely 
 Never 
 
30. When you buy a home appliance, do you buy extended warranty coverage? 
 Yes 
 No 
 I have never bought a home appliance 
 
31. Do you worry about having financial difficulties in your old age? 
 Yes, I worry quite a bit 
 Yes, I worry somewhat 
 No, I do not worry at all 
 




33. If there is something that you are not looking forward to (for example, some people 
dread going to their regular dental visit, a physical check-up, or a driving licence 




34. You have been given a prize of a wonderful meal (for two) in a very good restaurant 
in Montreal, but the offer is only good for one year. Do you:  
 use the prize as soon as possible? 
 wait for a while before using the prize? 
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The next set of questions describes the way some people feel about how much 
control they have over their lives. After each statement please indicate whether you 
strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree. 
 
35. You have little control over the things that happen to you. 
 Strongly disagree                   
 Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 
36. There is really no way you can solve some of the problems you have.  
 Strongly disagree                   
 Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 
37. There is little you can do to change many of the important things in your life.  
 Strongly disagree                   
 Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 
38. You often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life.  
 Strongly disagree                   
 Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 
39. Sometimes you feel that you are being pushed around in life.  
 Strongly disagree                   
 Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 
40. What happens to you in the future mostly depends on you.  
 Strongly disagree                   
 Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
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41. You can do just about anything you really set your mind to do.  
 Strongly disagree                   
 Disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 
42. Please indicate with a check mark () the community groups in which you 
participate: 
 ACEM 
 Association culturelle Tamoul du Canada 
 Association Latino-Americaine de CDN 
 Black community association CDN 
 Centre communautaire CDN 
 Centre culturel et communautaire des Iraniens 
 Centre d’action socio-communautaire 
 Centre d’integration multi-service de l’ouest 
 Centre Generation Emploi 
 Centre Multi-ecoute 
 Centre Multi-Ethnique 
 Centre social d’aide aux immigrants 
 Cercles d’emprunt de Montreal 
 Chinese Family Services 
 Cloverdale Multi-Resource 
 Club de recherche d’emploi 
 Communaute Hellenique 
 Communaute Vietnamienne 
 Conseil communautaire CDN/Snowdon 
 Dawson College training and dev. center 
 Dawson community centre 
 English Montreal Adult Ed. Centre 
 Groupe conseil St-Denis 
 Head & Hands 
 Italian women’s center 
 Jamaica Association of Montreal 
 James Ling Adult Education Centre 
 Jewish Family Services 
 John Abbott College Adult Ed. 
 Le Trait d’union 
 Montreal Assoc. of Black Business Professionals 
 Montreal West Community Center 
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 NDG Anti poverty group 
 NDG Black community association 
 NDG Community Center 
 NDG Community Council 
 Project Genesis 
 SACLI 
 SAJE Montreal Centre 
 SAJE Pointe Claire 
 South Asian Women’s Community Centre 
 Tyndale-St. Georges 
 West Island Community Resource Centre 
 West Island volunteer bureau 
 West Island women’s shelter 
Women’s centre of Montreal 
 Youth employment services 
 YMCA Enterprise Center 




 Ahuntsic- Cartierville 
 CDEC LaSalle, Lachine, St-Pierre 
 CDEST 
 CDN-NDG 
 Centre Nord 
 Centre Sud – Plateau Mont Royal 
 Corporation de relance economique communautaire 
 RESO sud-ouest 
 Rosemont & Petite Patrie 
 SODEC RDP Pointe aux Trembles 
 
43. After you answer this question, the survey is complete. Are you confident that you 





When you have finished, please give the two answered questionnaires. You are invited 
to randomly select the choice question for which you will receive compensation.




”Will the Working Poor Invest in Human Capital? 
A Laboratory Experiment”
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Table B.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion 































































Male 0.362  0.258  0.323  0.292      0.332 
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Table B.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion (Cont’d) 
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Table B.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion (Cont’d) 
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Table B.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion (Cont’d) 
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Table B.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion (Cont’d) 
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Table B.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion (Cont’d) 


























































































































Table B.2: Investment Preference Questions 
  Percentage of Participants Choosing the First Choice 

















































52 33.5  41.9  58.1  33.0  47.1 32.2 37.1 
53 51.9  54.8  67.7  54.1  63.5 47.4 52.7 
54 60.0  25.8  71.0  57.2  64.7 52.6 56.6 
55 77.8  71.0  64.5  77.3  78.8 74.3 75.8 
56 54.1  29.0  71.0  53.1  55.3 52.6 53.5 
57 54.6  45.2  67.7  56.2  67.1 48.0 54.3 
58 46.5  51.6  41.9  45.9  55.3 40.9 45.7 
59 48.1  48.4  41.9  48.5  44.7 49.7 48.0 
60 63.8  35.5  77.4  61.9  60.0 63.2 62.1 
61 75.7  61.3  87.1  73.2  82.4 69.6 73.8 
62 56.8  61.3  35.5  56.7  55.3 55.0 55.1 
63 75.7  48.4  90.3  72.2  74.1 74.3 74.2 
64 61.1  58.1  83.9  62.9  71.8 57.9 62.5 
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Table B.3: Time Preference Questions 
  Percentage of Participants Choosing the Earliest Payoff 

















































6 82.7  83.9  71.0  80.4  83.5  79.5  80.9 
2 80.5  67.7  71.0  76.3  76.5  77.8  77.3 
17 83.8  71.0  77.4  79.9 87.1  77.2  80.5 
12 87.6  77.4  77.4  85.1 82.4  86.0  84.8 
4 89.7  77.4  83.9  86.6  87.1  87.1  87.1 
9 76.8  77.4  64.5  76.3  76.5  73.7  74.6 
3 76.8  71.0  64.5  75.3  71.8  75.4  74.2 
13 80.0  77.4  71.0  79.4 82.4  76.0  78.1 
10 81.1  77.4  61.3  80.4 77.6  77.8  77.7 
8 85.9  67.7  80.6  82.5  84.7  81.9  82.8 
19 56.8  41.9  38.7  53.6 58.8  49.1  52.3 
11 61.1  58.1  45.2  58.8 63.5  56.1  58.6 
14 56.8  45.2  41.9  54.1 61.2  48.5  52.7 
21 51.4  32.3  38.7  49.5 52.9  43.3  46.5 
18 51.9  38.7  48.4  50.0 58.8  45.0  49.6 
20 57.3  48.4  48.4  55.7 60.0  51.5  54.3 
22 58.4  64.5  45.2  59.3 65.9  53.2  57.4 
15 56.2  45.2  48.4  57.2 61.2  49.1  53.1 
24 61.6  38.7  38.7  55.7 67.1  49.1  55.1 
25 60.5  41.9  38.7  55.7 63.5  50.9  55.1 
26 55.7  35.5  48.4  51.5 61.2  46.8  51.6 
16 62.7  54.8  48.4  60.3 63.5  58.5  60.2 
5 62.7  51.6  48.4  59.8  67.1  55.0  59.0 
28 66.5  51.6  51.6  62.4 70.6  57.9  62.1 
23 61.6  51.6  45.2  59.3 65.9  54.4  58.2 
7 64.3  48.4  25.8  54.1  67.1  50.3  55.9 
29 54.1  41.9  41.9  52.6 60.0  45.0  50.0 
30 42.7  29.0  29.0  38.7 50.6  32.7  38.7 
32 44.3  38.7  32.3  44.3 52.9  36.3  41.8 
33 55.7  54.8  41.9  55.7 58.8  50.9  53.5 
35 48.6  35.5  29.0  47.4 51.8  41.5  44.9 
36 38.9  29.0  29.0  39.2 45.9  32.2  36.7 
1 43.2  41.9  19.4  41.2  49.4  35.1  39.8 
37 64.3  64.5  54.8  65.5 65.9  61.4  62.9 
27 71.9  67.7  58.1  71.6 76.5  64.9  68.8 
34 55.1  51.6  48.4  55.7 63.5  48.5  53.5 
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Table B.4: Risk Preference Questions 
  Percentage of Participants Choosing the Less Risky Choice 

















































38 75.1  67.7  64.5  70.6 77.6  69.6  72.3 
39 76.2  58.1  77.4  73.2 71.8  73.7  73.0 
40 74.1  71.0  74.2  73.2 75.3  72.5  73.4 
41 77.3  64.5  74.2  74.7 74.1  74.9  74.6 
42 74.1  51.6  58.1  69.1 70.6  68.4  69.1 
43 82.2  77.4  67.7  79.9 81.2  78.9  79.7 
44 75.1  67.7  71.0  72.2 76.5  70.8  72.7 
45 81.6  77.4  67.7  78.9 82.4  76.6  78.5 
46 60.5  71.0  64.5  62.4 65.9  59.6  61.7 
47 56.2  71.0  61.3  61.9 54.1  62.6  59.8 
48 63.8  58.1  58.1  61.3 56.5  65.5  62.5 
49 68.1  71.0  64.5  69.1 65.9  67.8  67.2 
50 75.7  77.4  77.4  77.3 82.4  72.5  75.8 
51 56.2  71.0  54.8  61.3 60.0  57.9  58.6 
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